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he purpose of this paper is to investigate the learning from rare events and the knowledge management process
involved, which presents a significant challenge to many organizations. This is primarily attributed to the inability to
interpret these events in a systematic and “rich” manner, which this paper seeks to address. We start by summarizing the
relevant literature on humanitarian operations management (HOM), outlining the evolution of the socio-technical disaster
lifecycle and its relationship with humanitarian operations, using a supply chain resilience theoretical lens. We then outline theories of organizational learning (and unlearning) from disasters and the impact on humanitarian operations. Subsequently, we theorize the role of middle managers in humanitarian operations, which is the main focus of our paper. The
main methodology incorporates a hybrid of two techniques for root cause analysis, applied to two related case studies.
The cases were specifically selected as, despite occurring twenty years apart, there are many similarities in the chain of
causation and supporting factors, potentially suggesting that adequate learning from experience and failures is not occurring. This provides a novel learning experience within the HOM paradigm. Hence, the proposed approach is based on a
multilevel structure that facilitates the operationalization of learning from rare events in humanitarian operations. The
results show that we are able to provide an environment for multiple interpretations and effective learning, with emphasis
on middle managers within a humanitarian operations and crisis/disaster management context.
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1. Introduction
A disaster may be considered as a “black swan,” a
term coined by Taleb (2010) to describe an event
which has the three attributes: (i) rarity; (ii) extreme
impact; and (iii) retrospective predictability. The
“black swan” is a metaphor that describes an event
that comes as a surprise, has a major effect, and is
often inappropriately rationalized after the fact with
the benefit of hindsight. Taleb (2010) argues that this
phenomenon is accelerating as the world is getting
more complicated. Globally, natural and made-made
hazards are occurring at an increasing rate.
Borodzicz (2005, pp. 81–82) argues that a disaster is
an irreparable situation caused by failing to manage a
number of ongoing emergencies and crises. It has

overwhelming end results in terms of loss of life,
infrastructure and finances, leaving an indelible effect
on the organization. The United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction in February 2017 adopted a
formal definition of disaster that stated it is “A serious
disruption of the functioning of a community or a
society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and
capacity, leading to one or more of the following:
human, material, economic and environmental losses
and impacts” (UN General Assembly 2016). In the
past, theorists have highlighted that major man-made
disasters which occurred within organizations were
the outcome of systematic failures due to human, procedural and technical mistakes in the application of
operational
systems—so-called
socio-technical
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disasters (Bowonder 1987, pp. 176–180, Cox and Tait
1991, p. 93, Shrivastava et al. 1988, pp. 285–288, Toft
and Reynolds 1994, p. 3, Turner 1994, pp. 215–219).
More recently, some scholars have shown that more
often the line which divides causes of socio-technical
and natural disasters is increasingly thin: those which
were once called “acts of God,” such as floods, landslides and desertification, are nowadays progressively
more attributable to human actions (Gupta et al. 2016,
Weichselgartner 2001, pp. 85–86, Wells et al. 2000, p.
497).
There is anecdotal evidence that the impact of disasters can be significantly reduced through investment in
development activities that address the root causes of
vulnerability and embrace learning from experience
(Goldschmidt and Kumar 2016). However, learning
from rare and high severity events like disasters challenges the objective of learning through experience
(March 1991). Hence the inability to interpret and subsequently learn from such rare events becomes a major
challenge for organizations. Such problems can be
overcome if a “rich” and systematic approach to disaster interpretation is provided (Beck and Plowman
2009). Gaining robust experience in disaster management helps administrators in humanitarian organizations to take important decisions and effectively
establish rescue strategies (Gupta et al. 2016).
For humanitarian disasters, the complexity that
arises due to interactions between stakeholders, differing perceptions, lack of commonality in supporting
approaches and the maturity of the disaster response
mechanism that can often also be seen to add to challenges faced by responders and potentially hinder
learning from such events.
Organizations can effectively learn from limited
disaster experience in three specific ways. Firstly, they
can learn more and different aspects of the disaster as
it occurs through effective information-sharing policies, or learn as it happens (Altay and Pal 2014). Secondly, organizations can learn by exchanging
different interpretations of what has happened to create a mosaic of conflicting lessons. Both of these
exchanges seek to develop a clearer shared understanding of what has occurred, how it is evolving,
and the effect of the response. Thirdly, learning
occurs when we increase the variety of the multiple
perceptions and preferences of outcomes.
Learning from disaster, as a discipline, still has far
to go (Sanchez and Mitchell 2017, p. 200), as evidenced by both the frequency and severity of recent
events. As Bowker and Chambers (2015) identify in
their study of mining failures from 1910 to 2010, 55%
of all catastrophic (“very serious”) failures in the last
100 years have occurred since 1990, and 74% of all
failure events post-2000 are “serious” or “very serious.” This is not exclusive to the mining industry, of

course, and serves to highlight the importance of further research in this area.
The causal factors for disasters are difficult to assess
due to the challenging complexity involved. The need
for complexity analysis is argued by Komljenovic
et al. (2016). Such rare events that usually happen as a
surprise (the “black swan”) due to one’s knowledge/
beliefs can be categorized as (i) unknown unknowns
(events that are completely unknown to the decisionmakers); (ii) unknown knowns (analysts do not have
knowledge about the specific issue, but others do);
and (iii) events that are on the list of known events,
but judged to have a negligible probability of occurrence and thus are not believed to occur.
In this study, we propose a model that facilitates
learning from rare events. In particular, we show how
a set of hybrid tools used for the analysis of similar
events can lead to a deeper and varied interpretation,
hence extending the learning gained from rare yet
severe events. Such richness in learning has been
addressed by Beck and Plowman (2009), who argue
that middle managers can actively take a role in the
interpretation of rare and unusual events. They also
provide a temporal model of different stages of interpretation and include relevant types of cognitive bias
at each stage of interpretation.
This study will initially explore previous research
in a bid to define how disasters differ from failures, to
ascertain the key risks that disasters are based upon,
and to understand whether and how organizations
are able to learn from disasters. Furthermore, the concept of learning from failure and two analysis techniques will be described. Two disasters caused by
human actions will be presented and analyzed using
the two risk and failure models previously introduced; lessons learned and not learned will be drawn
to the attention of the reader.

2. Previous Research
In this section, we trace the theoretical developments
that relate to our investigation. We start by summarizing the relevant literature on humanitarian operations
management (HOM), outlining the evolution of the
socio-technical disaster lifecycle and, in particular, its
relationship with humanitarian operations, using a
supply chain resilience theoretical lens. We then outline theories of organizational learning (and unlearning) from disasters and the impact on humanitarian
operations. This will help to theorize the role of middle managers in humanitarian operations, which is
the main focus of our paper.
2.1. Humanitarian Operations Management
The pioneer of social–technical disaster studies was
Barry Turner. In 1978, he proposed a model in six
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stages to understand systematic failure within organizations (Turner 1978). A crisis or disaster, according
to Turner, begins with the incubation of an issue that
has been ignored, misunderstood or mismanaged,
resulting in escalation to the next stage and then to
the next, if the same errors and omissions in response
are repeated, culminating in disaster. Disasters have
an overwhelming impact not only on developing
countries, but wherever they occur. Hurricane Harvey, for instance, flooded Houston in 2017 with more
than four feet of rainfall, causing floods that were
unprecedented, showing the lack of preparedness
and response capability in one of the most powerful
countries in the world. It is hard to predict accurately
where or when a disaster could occur and which
areas are at high risk after disruptions (Peck 2006).
The efficiency of disaster relief operations relies on
organizations’ ability to know exactly where disaster
conditions exist and to plan the capacity to get medical procedures and relief supplies to the scene of trouble in the shortest time (Scholten et al. 2014).
Understanding the nature of the humanitarian operations helps to develop an effective response to, and
recovery from, crisis disruption (Sodhi and Tang 2014).
Humanitarian operations have unique characteristics
due to the large-scale devastation after a disaster, the
extremely tight lead time, and the unusual constraints
on humanitarian resources and logistics capabilities.
Moreover, factors such as a lack of data (Eftekhar et al.
2017), high variation in stakeholders’ interests (Ergun
et al. 2014), insufficient usage of resources and the
absence of customer power (in this case, beneficiaries
in need) (Holguin-Veras et al. 2013) add to the complexity of rescue operations post-disaster.
As a result of this complexity, many authors began
to test the applicability of the operations and supply
chain management (OSCM) models to the humanitarian field despite the significant difference between
these two fields (Besiou et al. 2014, Roth et al. 2016).
This trend is derived from the book Humanitarian
Logistics (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009), where
the authors, in their introduction, made a commitment to investigate how OSCM can be mapped across
the means and methods of humanitarian planning to
improve process efficiency. Charles et al. (2009)
responded to the call and modified a framework of
enterprise modeling (ISO 19439) to develop a framework of disaster management including four stages:
preparedness, immediate response, support and dismantling. Ali et al. (2017) used the supply chain resilience concept to identify three phases of disasters—the
pre-disaster, during disaster and post-disaster phases
—and five capabilities of disaster management: the
abilities to anticipate, to adapt, to respond, to recover
and to learn. Gupta et al. (2016), too, have defined
three time phases of disasters aligned with those
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phases of Ali et al. (2017): before, during and after the
disaster. Furthermore, the disaster lifecycle has
received various definitions in the literature. For
instance, the Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA 2013) focuses on disaster preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities. This
is in harmony with O’Brien et al.’s (2010) vision of the
disaster management cycle that comprises preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation capabilities.
Despite the key role that disaster preparedness,
response, recovery and mitigation play to help communities face the post-disaster devastation and bounce
back, limited attention is paid to the capacity of learning from the disaster experience. This gap is pointed
out by both Blackhurst et al. (2011) and J€
uttner et al.
(2007), who assert that research in the disaster management field needs to address the broader role of learning
capabilities to build resilience communities. The next
section will respond to this gap and present a review of
the theories of learning from disasters.
2.2. Theories of Learning from Disasters
How do we learn about learning from failures?
Researchers have stated different theories. Desai
(2010, pp. 715–716) highlights the magnitude by
which catastrophic failures encourage organizations
to learn from those events when presented through
reported case studies. However, Labib (2014, p. 11)
provides a taxonomy of theories related to learning
from disasters in the form of a list of contrasting dualities. Citing Taleb (2010), he argues that whoever presents a reported case study must be aware of
narrative fallacy. In terms of risk analysis and risk
perception, Reason (1997, p. 9) proposes the wellknown “Swiss cheese model” theory. Adding to this,
Kahneman (2012, p. 204) states that “the reward to
irresponsible risk-seekers” could be seen as slices
with too many holes or a lack of cheese slices; conversely, too many slices or slices with no holes can be
associated with adverse risk (Labib 2014, p. 12).
Two traditional schools of thought regarding organizational learning should be mentioned: normal accident theory (NAT) and high reliability organizations
(HRO). The first, proposed by Perrow (1984, pp. 5–11),
claims that the unpredictability of accidents is due to
the complexity of modern systems and their interconnectedness; thus the inevitability of failures is built in.
In contrast, the second theory (Rochlin et al. 1987)
shows how organizations can successfully prevent accidents when they continuously adopt high standards of
safe culture in complex systems, redundancy, dynamic
decision-making and flexibility to learn. Considering
this, Labib (2014, pp. 13–15) proposes an overall balanced approach, citing Pidgeon (1991), who addressed
four theories related to the safety culture: the paradox
of safety as an incubator for hazards; risk due to
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incompetence; a cultural background of risk acceptance; and critical issues on learning from failures.
However, in the 1990s, theorists were inclined to
give more emphasis to learning from successes than
from failures (Kim and Miner 2000, pp. 708–710;
McGrath 1999, pp. 16–20, Sitkin 1992, pp. 233–243).
This view gained limited acceptance, and the focus on
the benefit from learning from failure was restored.
At the start of the 21st century, several scholars not
only reinforced the significant concept of learning
from failure which occurred in the same organization,
but also started to investigate whether one could learn
from failures which happened in other organizations
(Carroll et al. 2002, pp. 117–129, Chuang and Baum
2003, pp. 38–41, Denrell 2003, pp. 227–230, Desai 2008,
pp. 594–596, Haunschild and Rhee 2004, pp.
1545–1549, 1556, Haunschild and Sullivan 2002, pp.
609–613). This built on the initial isomorphic learning
theory proposed by Toft and Reynolds (1994).
Kim and Miner (2007, pp. 687–689) and Madsen
(2009, pp. 872–873) proved that organizations can learn
more from failure than success and can exploit what
they have gleaned from near failures. However, recent
studies have highlighted that organizations do not
always capture this. Labib (2014, pp. 3–4) has illustrated
through reported cases of disasters how major organizations such as the National American Space Agency
(NASA), British Petroleum (BP) and Toyota failed to
learn from their failures, as evidenced by the repeated
occurrence of disasters in their own organizations.
Learning is not an easy process. Carroll et al. (2002,
p. 121) argue that organizational learning is a challenge;
it requires us to break mental models and habitual routines which are ingrained within the organizational culture. Recently, different scholars have shown how
organizations have been keener to focus on rare events
such as disasters and catastrophes, with greater desire
to invest in learning how to avoid the recurrence of
similar events (Beck and Plowman 2009, pp. 917–921,
Christianson et al. 2009, pp. 856–858, Madsen 2009, pp.
872–873, Rerup 2009, pp. 884–891, Starbuck 2009, pp.
929–935, Zollo 2009, pp. 895, 904–906). Based on those
studies, Lampel et al. (2009, pp. 838–840) provide two
types of impact on organizational learning: potential
impact, where they trigger a subsequent process of
learning, and potential relevance, where they influence
the scale of future capacity to learn within the organization. An overall evaluation is offered by Madsen and
Desai (2010, pp. 450–452, 470–472), who state that learning from failure rather than from success offers more
circumstances for experimental learning and is directly
linked to enhanced performance. Moreover, they argue
that previous researchers have been too focused on
learning the outcomes of failures rather than researching the process of learning from failures and how to
use models to facilitate this. This study fully supports

Madsen and Desai (2010) in their evaluation and again
stresses the need for the latter. Indeed, this focus on
learning from failure has permeated organizational
standards and generated the introduction of the first
British Standard in crisis management, BS11200:2014.
This explicitly recognizes what the academic literature
has found and proposed. Within the standard, the
importance of situational awareness and the need to
consider what may occur in the future, in part based
upon previous events, are clearly stated. Perhaps the
most robust acknowledgement of the need to learn
from crisis and disaster is seen within Section 8 of the
standard. The document highlights the transfer of academic musings as valid and integral inputs into an
organization’s resilience and an important tool in
preparing
for
and
responding
to
disaster
(BS11200:2014).
One of the first researchers to narrow his focus to
accidents was Trevor Kletz, who analyzed several
case studies and their underlying causes of failure. He
states, however, that to use accident models might
restrict the free thinking necessary to investigate accidents in a more obvious way (Kletz 2001, pp. 2–3, 7).
In this regard, several scholars have adopted hybrid
models to enhance flexibility in the presence of a several number of decision factors (Grigoriou et al. 2019,
Kou et al. 2014, pp. 95–97, Labib and Read 2015, pp.
7869–7874, Li et al. 2014a, pp. 116–118, Li et al. 2014b,
pp. 108–110, Vaidogas and Sakenaite 2010, pp. 391–
393, Zolfani et al. 2013, p. 89). Moreover, Labib and
Read (2013, pp. 397–399) propose an approach to
learn from failures, oriented towards process questions, focused on radical learning and based on learning from failure rather than variance questions,
control learning and learning from success.
Important practices are also introduced to leverage
learning after disasters, including post-disruption
knowledge management, knowledge sharing, enabling
an environment of trust, seeking out delivery of ideas,
and building social capital among the community
members, humanitarian teams and volunteers (Figure 1; Ali et al. 2017, Seville et al. 2015). Post-disruption knowledge management cultivates the learning
ability in the aftermath of disasters through education
Figure 1 Practices for Organizations to Embrace the Ability to Learn
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Organisations Ability
to Learn

Knowledge
Management

Knowledge
Sharing

Enable Environment
of Trust

Delivery of Ideas

Building Social
Capital

Labib, Hadleigh-Dunn, Mahfouz, and Gentile: Operationalizing Learning from Rare Events
Production and Operations Management 28(9), pp. 2323–2337, © 2019 Production and Operations Management Society

and training (Rice and Caniato 2003), post-disruption
feedback, cost/benefit knowledge (Blackhurst et al.
2011), self-reflection and simulation exercises. Humanitarian organizations must also ensure that knowledge
sharing is available on an ongoing basis between suppliers, communities and volunteers. In addition, creating a safe “high-trust” environment is critical for these
organizations to establish a culture of continuous
learning. It encourages all partners to speak up, offer
new ideas, support diversity of opinions and encourage innovative solutions. Finally, building social capital across supply chain entities and other community
stakeholders, in particular in disaster situations,
strengthens partners’ ability to learn through interorganizational relationships (Johnson et al. 2013) and
relational competence (Wieland 2013).
Although the policy and disaster management literature reports the importance of learning for disaster
management agencies, there are still insistent barriers
to learning lessons from failure (Macpherson et al.
2010). The same authors divided the barriers of effective post-crisis learning into three categories; cognitive, social, and organizational. While cognitive
barriers concern the intellectual biases embedded in
the values of the disaster managers that prevent them
from capturing the full lessons from disaster events
(Torlak 2004), social barriers are often caused by political and psychological factors. Organizational barriers, on the other hand, derive from the unclear
relationship between organization’s structure and the
learning process (Fiol and Lyles 1985). The decentralized structure of organizations facilitates more effective learning post-crisis, as it allows shifts in beliefs
and actions when dealing with disasters, as opposed
to centralized organizations, which tend to reinforce
past behaviour during and after the disaster.
2.3. Theorizing the Role of Middle Managers in
Humanitarian Operations
In this section, we attempt to theorize the role of middle managers in humanitarian operations. In particular, we address who “middle managers,” are and
their scope in terms of responsibility in humanitarian
operations. It has been suggested that middle managers are in a good position to facilitate both divergence and convergence of interpretations of rare and
unusual events (Beck and Plowman 2009), more
“richly,” using March’s (1991) term. Middle managers
are those who are able to make decisions about how
to implement the strategic objectives. They operate at
the intermediate level of the organizational hierarchical structure, normally two or three levels below the
CEO. Therefore, they are in a good position—through
their interactions with those above them, with those
they supervise, and with their peers—to enrich the
learning experience, because they are at the
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intersection of the vertical and horizontal flow of
information (Beck and Plowman 2009).
Response time is crucial to mitigate against both prolonged suffering and loss of life in the aftermath of any
disaster (Tatham and Christopher 2014). There is therefore a need for managers at both upper and middle
levels to encourage and promote approaches which
improve the logistic and rapid response to disasters.
Hence, it has been suggested (Tatham 2009, Tatham
et al. 2017) that advanced technologies such as drones
and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) have the
potential to support humanitarian logistical operations.
Specifically, such operations may include tasks such as
mapping of survivors and casualties, emergency communication, and assessment of environmental conditions, fires and structures. For more details on potential
applications, see Tatham et al. (2017). On the other
hand, such advanced technologies as drones and RPAS
can potentially have an ethical dimension, which may
be a concern to middle managers. It has been highlighted (Tatham et al. 2017) that the core concern is
mainly related to their association with military applications and their potential to increase the “distance”
between the beneficiaries and the aid workers.
Middle managers can be engaged to focus on logistics activities related to needs assessment in terms of
assessing the 4W question—who wants what,
where?—which offers challenges due to the unknown
nature of the population demographic, such as old vs.
young; male vs. female and so on, of the affected areas
(Tatham and Kovacs 2010). Such a demand-based
mindset by middle managers can lead to a shift in
logistics from a push-based to a more effective and
efficient pull-based approach (Christopher 2016).
2.4. Risk Assessment and Modeling Failures
Aiming to define the difference between learning from
a disaster and from a failure, Turner (1994) described a
disaster as a situation which forces society to change its
patterns due to the magnitude of the catastrophic event,
whereas failures might be seen as a collapse of precautions that do not lead to a perceived needed change,
and so learning is more difficult (Smith 1990, p. 117).
As shown previously, in order to avoid occurrences of
failure, organizations should aim to achieve high reliability in processing complex systems. To this end,
Weick and Sutcliffe (2011, p. 2) suggest that organizations should continuously seek the following key principles: “track small failures, resist oversimplification
and remain sensitive to operations” in the failure anticipation stage, and “maintain capabilities for resilience”
and “shift location of expertise” in the containment
stage. It is important to remember that organizations
are complex sociotechnical systems; hence, all their
components should be involved in a proactive risk
management (RM) process to maintain high reliability.
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Aiming to support this process, Rasmussen (1997, pp.
186–192) identified the human factor as the decisive
cause of failure in 78% of cases and proposed a model
of boundaries not focused on error and violation, but
based on systems able to influence human behaviors in
their work context. This new approach revealed an
updated vision with regard to control of system performance. From this perspective, RM is identified as a control function to contain hazards and operation
processes under an overall safe control system.
Models of risk assessment (RA) such as fault tree
analysis (FTA), failure mode effect analysis (FMEA)
and the risk matrix “as low as reasonably practical”
(ALARP), are inspired by the theoretical concept of
control system function. They deal with risk of failures through strategies such as avoidance, mitigation,
transference, and absorption, and they are usually
embedded in a plan–do–check–act (PDCA) cycling
system. The FTA is the most significant probabilistic
and logic technique used in RA. This is a top-down
approach to failure analysis in which causes of a main
event are connected in a logical way through “AND”
and “OR” gates to minor level events in order to identify all the possible ways in which the main event
might occur. The FTA implemented by reliability
block diagrams (RBD) becomes an important model
of system reliability assessment. The two techniques
are complementary: while the FTA highlights the logical causes of failure, the RBD identifies the vulnerable point of the analyzed event. Their best application
is found in large-scale failures or disasters, and when
they are implemented by numerical probability of
occurrence, they can be used to evaluate the likelihood of predictable failures. Moreover, they are ideal
advanced tools for learning from previous failures
(Labib and Read 2013, p. 399). Therefore, FTA and
RBD will be used to facilitate analysis of the two case
studies presented in this study in order to identify the
generic lessons from those failures.
2.4.1. Introduction to the Techniques Used: FTA
Diagrams. The main content of this section is based
on Labib (2014, pp. 21–25). One can imagine an FTA
as a language with mainly two letters in the form of
logic gates, the “OR” and “AND” gates. The gates
describe the relationship between the input causes
(E1, E2) and the output effect (A), as shown in
Figure 2. Note that there are other types of logic gate,
but with these two, we can model most problems. The
OR-gate indicates that the output event occurs only if
one or more of the input events occur. The AND-gate
indicates that the output event occurs only if all the
input faults occur at the same time. There may be any
number of input faults to any of the two gates.
Construction of the fault tree always starts from the
TOP event, as shown in Figure 3. Those fault events

Figure 2 The Two Main Logic Gates of the Fault Tree [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Logical symbols
“Or” gate

A

E2

“And” gate
E2

E1

A

E1

that are immediate, necessary and sufficient causes
should be carefully identified and connected to the
TOP event through a logic gate. The first level of
causes under the TOP event is often referred to as the
TOP structure of the fault tree. Then, the construction
of the fault tree can be traced level by level, until all
fault events have been developed to the prescribed
level of resolution. This deductive analysis method is
carried out by repeatedly asking, “what are the reasons for this event?”
2.4.2. The Reliability Block Diagram. The RBD
is an equivalent diagram based on the construction of
the fault tree. Figure 4 shows how to map FTA into
an RBD diagram. There are two rules that help to perform such a mapping exercise:
Rule No 1: Every OR-gate in an FTA is equivalent
to a series structure in an RBD.
Rule No 2: Every AND-gate in an FTA is equivalent to a parallel structure in an RBD.
Note that one can assess the vulnerability of the
system from the RBD, where a general series type
structure is vulnerable. Also, vulnerability can be formally assessed using a method called minimum cut
sets. In the case of a parallel type structure, this indicates a more resilient system. An example of a parallel
structure is to have redundancy, or a back-up system.
For more details on how to construct and analyze
FTAs and RBDs, as well as their use and limitations,
the reader can refer to Labib (2014), Labib and Harris
(2015), and Labib and Read (2013).

3. The Two Case Studies
In this section, we describe two case studies, the
Vajont and Strava dam disasters, which occurred in
Italy in 1963 and 1985, respectively. These events were
selected to assess whether learning had occurred in
the intervening period. They occurred in the same
sector, in the same country, and a little over 20 years
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Figure 3 Construction of the Fault Tree

apart. We also attempt to focus our analysis on the
role of middle managers in both incidents, using the
same analytical hybrid tools in both case studies as
way of demonstration.
Note that the two disasters are presented in the
form of two case studies based on data available in
the public domain, from existing reports or based on
related accounts in the literature. Also, in presenting
the two case studies, we are aware of the trap of narrative fallacy: when possible, therefore, we attempt to
assign a confidence level to the arguments presented,
especially if they are not based on factual evidence.
We have also attempted to provide a better understanding of causal factors by investigating each case
from different perspectives using more than one mental model, or incorporating more than one technique,
in the analysis.
3.1. The Vajont Disaster, Italy, 1963
At 22:39 on October 9, 1963, a rockslide of about
260 million m3 dashed into the waters of the alpine
Vajont Dam, 75 km north of Venice, Italy. The dam

resisted the impact, but the enormous wave of 50 million m3 water generated by the slide, after it had
washed away the opposite side of the valley and
destroyed two villages located 200 m above the lake,
found its way back to the artificial reservoir. For the
second time, the dam resisted the giant wave which
engulfed it. At 22:43, a mass of over 25 million m3 of
water fell into the valley below the dam and completely destroyed Longarone town (Cadau 2012, p.
45).
The Vajont disaster was the outcome of two congruent factors, human and environmental, where the first
triggered the second. In the 1930s, geological surveys
revealed a pre-historic rockslide of unknown dimensions leaning on a stable but inclined rock surface, the
same surface on which the rockslide occurred on
October 9, 1963 (Semenza 2005, p. 34). Even so, the
SADE, a nationwide power energy organization,
decided to build the dam in that location due to
strong economic interest. Between 1960 and 1963,
despite a number of failures due to minor slides,
small earthquakes and cracks which occurred in the
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Figure 4 Construction of the Equivalent Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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area of the subsequent massive rockslide, and a new
geological report which warned of the imminent danger of rock detachment, the SADE administration
decided to carry out the reservoir filling test up to the
715 mean sea level (msl) necessary for plant approval,
due to a change in ownership from the Italian national
energy agency (ENEL). The excessive speed of emptying the lake triggered the definitive Vajont rockslide
(Paolini and Vacis 1997, pp. 31–78).
In all, 1910 lives, Longarone town, Erto and Casso
villages, and a number of small hamlets and standalone houses were lost. Water and energy supplies
and all means of communication were interrupted for
several days. The dam cost 3 billion lire to build in
1959 (equal to roughly €1.55 billion in 2017), of which
45% was financed by the national public. The dam
never started to produce energy either before or after
the disaster, because where Vajont lake originally
stood, now there was a mountain of rock debris
(Dagradi et al. 2013).
As shown below in the FTA of the Vajont disaster
(Figure 5), there were two main causes: the first
was environmental—the rockslide was there before
the dam; the second was attributable to human factors—the SADE demonstrated very low reliability.
Note here that in our construction of the causal factors in the FTA model, we focus on the human factors, and specifically those that relate to the remit of
middle managers, which is the emphasis of our

Parallel structure
scope of analysis. Despite the redundancy of technical surveys and prioritizing of lucrative aspects, the
SADE administration did not take into consideration
the suggestion made by two geologists, that even if
the enormous entity of the slide was not able to be
proved in a mathematical way, they strongly suggested that the dam be built in a different location
in the valley and of a reduced size (Semenza 2005,
p. 33).
These two pre-construction decisions have equal
weight with the other two human factors that caused
the subsequent disaster. Firstly, the operative room
was warned by the same two geologists not to fill the
reservoir above 700 msl, and to empty the artificial
lake as much as possible in order not to increase the
speed of the already unstoppable rockslide. Both bad
operative management decisions increased the magnitude of the inevitable catastrophe. Secondly, as can
be seen in the RBD (Figure 6), the total absence of a
safe culture within the SADE administration created a
series of conditions led by the main thought that “it
will never happen.” Therefore, at the time of the disaster, there was no emergency evacuation in place;
nor were emergency services alerted to what was
likely to happen. Also, note that the series configuration in terms of factors related to lack of knowledge
and lack of safe culture highlights the vulnerability in
the system, and the fact that such factors need to be
addressed as a matter of priority in order to mitigate
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Figure 5 Fault Tree Analysis Model of the Vajont Disaster [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 6 Reliability Block Diagram Model of the Vajont Disaster
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against future incidents. The role of FTA is therefore
important to model the relationship between causal
factors, and the role of RBD is to identify areas of vulnerability.
Notice here that in constructing the different hierarchical levels of the FTA shown in Figure 5, we can
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highlight the middle level of the model as a main concern for middle managers.
Using the theoretical lens of Beck and Plowman
(2009), which argues that middle managers are in a
good position to facilitate richer divergence and convergence of interpretations of rare and unusual
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present underground or derived from rainfall. Furthermore, according to the initial project, the lower
dam should have stopped at a height of 9 m, and the
upper at 19 m. On July 19, 1985, they were 26 m and
34 m high, respectively; the total man-made basin
was 60 m high and contained about 300,000 m3 of
water and debris. Moreover, the pressure exerted by
the water in the upper dam was excessive, inasmuch
as the walls of the dam were built with an inclination
of 38% when 32% was considered the limit. Finally,
there is no indication that any RA was carried out by
the staff responsible for the two dams at any time; no
structural reinforcement was done; and there were no
controls by the technical local authority, which made
a site inspection only once, in 1975. (Sammarco 2004,
pp. 91–93, Tosatti 2007, pp. 2–4).
According to the reconstruction of events, the
upper dam collapsed first into the lower, which failed
immediately afterwards. The mudflow killed 268 people and erased an area of 462,000 m2, including 71
building and eight bridges. Not least, in the middle of
the tourist summer season, the entire valley was economically penalized by the decreased number of visitors (Tosatti 2007, p. 5).
The FTA of the Stava disaster (Figure 7) shows
three main causes: an unusually intense rainfall in the
period antecedent to the failure, tailing liquefaction
and human factors. What provoked the collapse of
the upper dam, though, was the liquefaction of the
tailings at its base due to the enormous quantity of

events, we are able to demonstrate the concerns that
are more likely to be affiliated with middle managers.
Such concerns, as shown in Figure 5, may include
issues related to operative management in terms of
allowing water levels to be over 700 msl and the high
speed of emptying and refilling. Similarly, issues
related to lack of knowledge about geological models
or suitable technology may be involved.
3.2. The Stava Disaster, Italy, 1985
On July 19, 1985 at 12:22 pm, about 70 km west of
Lake Vajont, two artificial dams at 1400 msl, used for
the decantation of fluorite extracted from the nearby
mines, suddenly collapsed. A wave higher than 10 m
and 180,000 m3 of water, tailings and mud overwhelmed the hamlet of Stava and all the single houses
found in its down-valley trajectory at an estimated
speed of 90 km per hour. The mudflow stopped after
it had destroyed everything found in its path for
4.2 km (Sammarco 2004, pp. 91–92).
The two dams were situated on an inclined surface
of about 14° in a Dolomite valley rich with underground springs. They were made by a process known
as “upstreaming,” well known in the mining industry
as one of the less reliable methods inasmuch as the
basin is made by the progressive sedimentary deposit
of debris resulting from the mining process. The first
dam (lower) was used as a base for the second (upper). The lower dam was built without any preventive
reinforcement work to reduce the amount of water

Figure 7 Fault Tree Analysis Model of the Stava Disaster [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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these areas, as well as enacting more adequate policies and procedures for risk management.
Finally, in the six months prior to the disaster, two
different failures occurred within the same draining
pipe in the lower dam, which were not fixed properly.
This underlines the superficial approach to the
already overall complex situation. Periodic inspections and proper crisis management could have saved
268 lives and the industrial plant.

water and the pressure exerted by it. However, the
other two factors were equally responsible for the disaster: in fact, the liquefaction could not have happened had the base of both dams not been swamped
with water due to the intense precipitation. Furthermore, the total absence of RA drove the appointed
staff to operate without controls with regard to the
level of water and its percentage in comparison to the
tailing, the increasing height and inclination of the
wall of the upper dam, and the consequent rising
water level and pressure. Again, such issues are the
concern of middle managers and, again using the theoretical lens of Beck and Plowman (2009), we can
focus on such issues when constructing the FTA
model.
Moreover, as can be seen in the RBD (Figure 8), the
absence of RM has been highlighted with equal
weight to the absence of technical inspection by the
local authority. In fact, had those controls been carried
out, the rising walls of the upper dam could have
been stopped years in advance. The absence of suitable controls by local authorities is a further indication of failure. Again, it should be emphasized here
that having a set of boxes arranged in a series configuration in the RBD is attributed to poor risk management, and such vulnerability requires urgent
attention with respect to the remit of middle managers. The contributing factors to such poor risk management can be mitigated through more training in

4. Generic Lessons from These Failures
The overarching generic lesson from this work is that
in order to have effective and efficient mitigation, it is
important to reflect upon the lessons learned and use
them. The approach of utilizing the proposed hybrid
techniques can facilitate such a learning process.
Hence, problem structuring of causal factors and their
relationship in the form of a fault tree with emphasis
on the role of middle management, coupled with a
vulnerability analysis in the form of a block diagram,
means that such a hybrid model can act as a mental
model that summarizes casual factors and improves
resilience.
Within this section, in particular, we focus on two
generic lessons that relate to knowledge and complexity in learning from rare events.
The first generic lesson relates to the assessment of
existing knowledge. Both disasters were characterized

Figure 8 Reliability Block Diagram Model of the Stava Disaster
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by a non-existent safety culture and a background of
a poor level of knowledge by the private organizations coupled with a total absence of controls by the
public authorities. In the Vajont case, even if the technology at the time was not sufficient to highlight the
real hazard, the SADE always decided on the more
lucrative choice rather than putting safety first, which
should never be an option. The same could be said
about the staff at Stava, but there is no justification for
the lack of engineering knowledge.
The second generic lesson relates to understanding
the complexity of decision-making within humanitarian operations’ logistics. In terms of humanitarian
operations, organizations which operate in complex
systems due to environmental factors should be
aware of the tremendous impact on the surrounding
human and natural life which could be caused by
their failure. Redundancy in terms of a critical technical approach and a safety culture should always be
prioritized in both designing and building any future
industrial plant of this magnitude. The national
authority in the first case and local engineers in the
Stava case did not implement the controls necessary
to preserve the safety of the citizens. Moreover, they
agreed to build two highly dangerous infrastructures
right above inhabited locations; considering the disasters that occurred in these two cases, it is suggested
that in the future, the emergence of similar situations
will never be allowed. The rigid hierarchy of the
SADE administration model and the inadequate management at Stava has highlighted the absolute importance of risk and crisis management. These two
significant rules should be addressed by the national
authority via a mandatory requirement of all organizations involved in any modification of the environment that could cause hazards for the nearby
population.

5. General Discussion
Throughout this study, we have emphasized that
within humanitarian operations there are three
phases: preparedness, response and recovery. However, if one looks at the UN OCHA (2013) disaster lifecycle model, there are in fact four phases, the fourth
being mitigation. As mentioned in the previous section, in order to have effective and efficient mitigation, it is important to take the lessons learned and
use them. The approach proposed in this study is a
way forward with clearly proposed analytical tools.
Although Vajont and Stava involved two completely different organizations, they have been chosen
in order to show how low reliability can drive organizations to the occurrence of similar failures, sadly
with similarly tragic results. It could be said that these
two cases are aligned with Perrow’s (1984) normal

accident theory, inasmuch as both organizations were
operating in a complex system, accentuated by unpredictable environmental changes, which caused the
unavoidable failures. This provides a novel learning
experience within the HOM paradigm and builds
upon the work of Labib and Harris (2015) as stated at
the outset of this study. One of the characteristics of
HROs highlighted by Rochlin et al. (1987) is the critical ability to learn. It seems fair to say that the managers at Stava did not learn any lessons from the
Vajont disaster: indeed, neither organization showed
this capacity.
However, when an organization has high reliability
and an ability to learn, the theory finds application in
practical reality, as can be seen in the case of the
Downie slide in British Columbia, Canada. The construction of the Revelstoke Dam and the consequent
reservoir were threatened by an enormous pre-historic land slide. Managers of the organization in
charge studied the Vajont case and asked for supervision by the geologist Dr Semenza, one of the two geologists who recognized the real threat of the Vajont
rockslide in the beginning. Learning came from that
failure, and in 1983 massive engineering work was
undertaken; the landslide was stabilized and the dam
built, which is still functional now (Barrotta 2012, p.
85, Hoek 1991, p. 1485).

6. Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed two case studies
and incorporated the use of FTA and RBD tools in
order to facilitate the process of identification of causal factors. This was followed by the extraction of a
set of recommendations and generic lessons as an
outcome of the analysis. Moreover, this study is an
attempt to provide a set of tools that can operationalize “rich” learning from rare events, as originally
conceptualized by James March (March 1991), and to
reiterate the importance of organizational learning
from failures.
In terms of future research directions, we propose
to extend this work by investigating the second classification of hybrid approaches proposed by Calvin and
Labib (2018). Hybrid approaches can be classified in
two ways: either through the models and their solution procedures, or through use of the solution procedure of independent types of model. The former
option is called the hybrid model, the latter hybrid
modeling. In our current approach, we focused on the
former option, where an output of one type of modeling can be an input to the other. In future research,
one can use hybrid modeling, examining the same
disaster using multiple models independently and
comparing their findings. This will add richness to
our understanding and test whether assumptions
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embedded within each modeling approach can be
canceled by other approaches. Another further
research direction is to use the high reliability organization framework proposed by Agwu et al. (2019) to
assess the maturity levels of those organizations affiliated with humanitarian operations.
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